

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 DODE-00  
CIAE-00 ACDE-00 DOEE-00 /026 W  
-----091742 191320Z /41  
O 191241Z JUL 78  
FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2263  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 11095

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PASS TO DOE

E.O.11652:XGDS-3  
TAGS: PARM US UK UR  
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: SOVIET VIEWS ON NSS

CTB MESSAGE NO. 263

1. SUMMARY: WARNKE (US) AND ADVISERS MET ON JULY 17 WITH PETROSYANTS (USSR) AND ADVISERS PRIMARILY TO DISCUSS NATIONAL SEISMIC STATION (NSS) ISSUES. SOVIETS MADE PRESENTATION OUTLINING THEIR NSS POSITION, INCLUDING COMMITMENT ULTIMATELY TO INSTALL HIGH QUALITY EQUIPMENT WITH AUTHENTICATORS, AND TO OPERATE STATIONS WITHOUT INTERRUPTION ON ROUND-THE-CLOCK BASIS. DATA WOULD BE PROVIDED ON MAGNETIC TAPES. IN RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC QUESTION BY WARNKE, SOVIETS INDICATED FOR FIRST TIME THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO AGREE TO PROVIDING ALL OF THE NSS DATA. PETROSYANTS INDICATED THAT THE SIDES WERE NOT TOO FAR APART ON NUMBERS OF NSS IN THE CONTEXT OF A FIVE-YEAR TREATY, BUT THE SOVIETS WERE NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS NUMBERS IN DETAIL UNTIL TREATY DURATION WAS SETTLED. THERE

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WAS ALSO A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF US PROPOSAL FOR AN AGREED UNDERSTANDING RELATING TO REQUESTS FOR ON-SITE INSPECTIONS, WITH PETROSYANTS ARGUING THAT THE UNDERSTANDING WAS REDUNDANT AND WARNKE STRESSING ITS IMPORTANCE FOR THE US IN THE CONTEXT OF ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF VOLUNTARY ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS. WARNKE OPENED DISCUSSION BY OBSERVING THAT NSS WAS PROBABLY THE MOST COMPLEX ISSUE IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAD REACHED A MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON OTHER PROBLEM AREAS AND UNDERSTOOD WHERE DIFFERENCES REMAINED. IN RELATION TO NSS, HOWEVER, WE STILL DID NOT HAVE CLEAR PICTURE OF THE SOVIET POSITION. PETROSYANTS RESPONDED THAT THE NSS ISSUE DID NOT APPEAR TO HIM TO BE SO COMPLEX; HE WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT TOGETHER WE WOULD BE ABLE TO FIND A GOOD BASIS FOR AGREEMENT. HE THEN ASKED TARASOV (USSR) TO PRESENT SOVIET VIEWS.

3. TARASOV, SPEAKING FROM PREPARED STATEMENT (TO FOLLOW), REPEATED STANDARD SOVIET LINE THAT VERIFICATION SHOULD BE PRIMARILY BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS SUPPLEMENTED BY AN INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA. HE SAID THE SOVIETS HAD THOROUGHLY STUDIED THE MATERIALS PRESENTED BY THE US, NOTING THAT THE PROTOTYPE NSS IS "FAIRLY FAR" FROM BEING COMPLETE, AND ITS RELIABILITY HAS NOT YET BEEN CONFIRMED IN OPERATION. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IS FOR AN NSS PROGRAM IN TWO STAGES. IN THE FIRST STAGE THE PARTIES WOULD RELY ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS SUPPLEMENTED BY AN INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA. THIS WOULD CONSIST OF "FIRST LEVEL" AND "SECOND LEVEL" DATA (I.E., IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CCD SEISMIC EXPERTS' RECOMMENDATIONS). WITH A VIEW TO INCREASING CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE, THE US,  
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UK AND USSR COULD AGREE TO THE EXCHANGE OF ADDITIONAL SEISMIC DATA FROM "A CERTAIN NUMBER" OF SEISMIC STATIONS TO BE AGREED UPON. IT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO AGREE IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS OF THESE STATIONS, WITH THE TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STATIONS TO BE WORKED OUT IN THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION. IN THE FIRST STAGE, EXISTING SEISMIC STATIONS WOULD BE USED. IN THE SECOND STAGE, IMPROVED SEISMIC EQUIPMENT WITH AN AUTHENTICATOR WOULD BE INSTALLED. THE STATIONS WOULD CONTAIN EQUIPMENT FOR DIGITAL MAGNETIC TAPE RECORDING OF SEISMIC DATA AND WOULD OPERATE WITHOUT INTERRUPTION ROUND-THE-CLOCK. THE TAPES WOULD BE EXCHANGED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED PROCEDURES. THE SOVIETS BELIEVED AUTHENTICATION WAS NOT NECESSARY SINCE -- IN VIEW OF THE CAPABILITIES OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS -- FALSIFICATION OF DATA FROM A NUMBER OF STATIONS WOULD BE DIFFICULT AND RISKY. BUT TO ACCOMMODATE THE US, THE SOVIET SIDE WAS PREPARED TO AGREE TO INSTALL AUTHENTICATOR. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO AGREE FIRST ON THE METHOD OF AUTHENTICATION, AND THEN ON THE MAIN TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEVICE.

4. NUMBERS AND QUALITY OF NSS. WARNKE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR TARASOV'S PRESENTATION BUT INDICATED THAT HE STILL HAD SOME QUESTIONS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN ANSWERED. ON NUMBERS OF NSS, WHAT DID THE SOVIETS HAVE IN MIND? WE HAD SUGGESTED 15 STATIONS. WARNKE ALSO PRESSED FOR MORE INFORMATION ON THE SORT OF UPGRADE THE SOVIETS HAD IN MIND FOR THE "SECOND STAGE" OF NSS. PETROSYANTS SAID THAT DURATION WAS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR BEARING ON NSS NUMBERS AND DESIGN. FOR A TREATY OF UNLIMITED DURATION

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-----091880 191325Z /41

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FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2264  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

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THE SIDES UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD BE PREPARED TO INCUR LARGE EXPENDITURES, BUT FOR A TREATY OF SHORT DURATION WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHETHER IT WAS WORTH THE TIME AND RESOURCES REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH A PARTICULAR NSS CAPABILITY. WITH A TREATY OF LIMITED DURATION, EVEN ONE OF THREE YEARS, WE WOULD NOT KNOW WHETHER THE TREATY WOULD BE EXTENDED. TO ILLUSTRATE HIS POINT, PETROSYANTS SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE FOOLISH TO BUILD AN EXPENSIVE HOUSE IF YOU EXPECTED TO LIVE IN IT FOR ONLY ONE DAY. PETROSYANTS ASKED THAT THESE FACTORS BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN SHAPING THE US POSITION ON NSS. HE ADDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT AS EXPERIENCED AS THE US IN BUILDING STATIONS LIKE THESE; THE US HAS BEEN BUILDING SUCH STATIONS ON ITS OWN TERRITORY AND ALONG THE BORDERS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THUS IS BETTER PREPARED THAN THE USSR FOR THIS TASK. HE ADDED, IN PASSING, THAT US NATIONAL MEANS ALONE SHOULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE.

6. WARNKE RESPONDED THAT WHETHER THE TREATY DURATION WAS TO BE THREE YEARS OR FIVE YEARS, THE VERIFICATION ARRANGE-  
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MENTS WOULD BE IMPORTANT. WE HAVE ALWAYS THOUGHT OF NSS AS A BASIC PART OF THE OVERALL AGREEMENT. IN THE US VIEW, NATIONAL MEANS ALONE ARE NOT ADEQUATE FOR MONITORING A CTB. PETROSYANTS MUST REALIZE THAT THERE WILL BE SUSPICIONS; THERE WILL BE THOSE WHO BELIEVE VIOLATIONS ARE TAKING PLACE. WARNKE THOUGHT PETROSYANTS WOULD AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF DOUBTS ABOUT COMPLIANCE JEOPARDIZED THE VIABILITY OF THE TREATY WE ARE NEGOTIATING. ALL WE HAVE IN MIND IS BEING COMFORTABLE WITH THE VERIFICATION SITUATION AND HAVING CONFIDENCE THAT NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS ARE NOT TAKING PLACE. PICKING UP ON PETROSYANTS' ANALOGY WITH BUILDING A HOUSE, WARNKE SUGGESTED THAT IF ONE BUILT A FAULTY HOUSE -- WITH A LEAKY ROOF AND DEFECTIVE PLUMBING -- THEN HE WOULD CERTAINLY CHOOSE NOT TO LIVE IN IT FOR VERY LONG. PETROSYANTS AGREED OUEFM

7. WARNKE PRESSED THE SOVIETS FOR THEIR VIEWS ON THE QUALITY OF NSS EQUIPMENT. COULD HE ASSUME THEY WOULD AGREE TO THE USE OF NSS EQUIPMENT OF HIGH QUALITY ONCE THEIR EXPERTS WERE SATISFIED REGARDING ITS RELIABILITY? WE DIDN'T WANT TO BE FACED WITH A SOVIET CONCERN THAT NSS EQUIPMENT WAS "TOO GOOD". ARE WE IN AGREEMENT THAT THERE WILL BE HIGH QUALITY NSS? PETROSYANTS REPLIED THAT THE SIDES ARE INDEED IN AGREEMENT ON HAVING HIGH QUALITY NSS EQUIPMENT. IT IS IMPORTANT, HE SAID, THAT PUBLIC OPINION KNOW THAT THE US AND USSR HAVE PROVIDED MEANS OF MONITORING THE TREATY. PETROSYANTS ADDED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS WILLING TO AGREE TO SUCH MEASURES IN ORDER TO HELP WITH THE RATIFICATION PROCESS. WARNKE OBSERVED THAT THE NON-PROLIFERATION INTERESTS OF OUR COUNTRIES ALSO WOULD BE BEST SERVED BY HAVING A TREATY THAT ALL COULD SEE IS BEING COMPLIED WITH. RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF COMPLETE SEISMIC DATA, WARNKE ASKED WHETHER HE HAD UNDER-  
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STOOD CORRECTLY THAT, IN THE SECOND STAGE OF NSS, THE SOVIETS PROPOSED PROVIDING FULL ROUND-THE-CLOCK DATA FROM THE NSS. PETROSYANTS REPLIED, "YES, FOR THE SECOND STAGE THAT IS CORRECT."

8. REGARDING THE PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE, THE

SOVIET DELEGATION HAS CONSULTED EXPERTS AND BELIEVES THAT THE US SIDE IS VERY OPTIMISTIC IN PROJECTING ESTABLISHMENT OF AN NSS NETWORK IN TWO YEARS. THEY BELIEVE TWO YEARS IS "FAR FROM ENOUGH TIME" FOR SUCH A PROJECT. WARNKE PRESSED THE SOVIETS FURTHER. WHAT NUMBER OF NSS COULD BE INSTALLED? HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE TIME REQUIRED FOR CONSTRUCTION WAS RELATED TO TREATY DURATION, CITING AS AN EXAMPLE THE SITUATION OF TAKING THREE YEARS TO BUILD AN NSS NETWORK UNDER A 4-YEAR TREATY. PETROSYANTS THEN SAID, "YES, WE WILL INSTALL UPGRADED NSS EQUIPMENT EVEN IF THE DURATION IS FOUR YEARS. WE WILL INSTALL SUCH EQUIPMENT."

9. PETROSYANTS CONCLUDED THE NSS DISCUSSION BY OBSERVING THAT WARNKE'S QUESTIONS REGARDING SOVIET VIEWS ON NSS WERE "QUITE LEGITIMATE AND WARRANTED." HE THOUGHT THE SIDES WERE NOT SO FAR APART ON THE NSS ISSUES. THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON A NUMBER OF POINTS. PETROSYANTS THEN REITERATED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS NUMBERS OF NSS UNTIL THE QUESTION OF TREATY DURATION WAS SETTLED.

10. WARNKE THEN TURNED TO THE US PROPOSAL FOR AN AGREED UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE ARBITRARINESS IN RESPONDING TO REQUESTS FOR ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. PETROSYANTS EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING WAS NEEDED. IN HIS VIEW, THE LANGUAGE OF THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT WAS ADEQUATE AND THERE WOULD BE LANGUAGE ON WITHDRAWAL IN THE MULTILATERAL TREATY. THE AGREED UNDERSTANDING THEREFORE APPEARED TO BE REDUNDANT.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 DODE-00  
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-----091863 191324Z /41

O 191241Z JUL 78  
FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2265  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

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PASS TO DOE

WARNKE RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS A MATTER OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE US. INDEED, IT WAS ONE OF THE FACTORS ENABLING THE US TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF VOLUNTARY ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. THE AGREED UNDERSTANDING WHICH THE US HAD PROPOSED WAS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE LANGUAGE OF THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT AND THE MULTILATERAL TREATY. BUT IT WAS NOT REDUNDANT. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE ISSUE WOULD BE PURSUED FURTHER IN THE POLITICAL WORKING GROUP. JOHNSON

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## Message Attributes

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**Decaption Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
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**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014